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A significant feature of oral history over the past few decades has been an interest in memory, 
witnessing, and mourning. Most research in this area has understandably focused on memories of 
violence and loss suffered by human beings in war, genocide, and other major catastrophes.  Recent 1
research in animal history and animal studies, however, argues that human beings can and should 
also bear witness to the violence committed against other-than-human animals, and that mourning is 
not an experience unique to people or to human-human relations. This article brings these two fields 
of study - oral history and animal studies - into conversation through an exploration of the themes of 
witnessing and mourning in a life story interview with an animal rights activist. It aims both to 
encourage oral historians to be more attentive to other-than-human animals in their research, and to 
demonstrate that oral history can contribute valuable evidence about animal lives and human-animal 
relations to the emerging field of animal history. 
By way of setting the scene, the paper opens with some examples of published oral histories 
featuring people’s memories of animals. The remainder concentrates on an interview with animal 
rights activist Dolors Benet (born in Barcelona in 1937),  bringing in some comparative examples of 2
interviews with other activists from Spain and Britain. I chose to focus on the interview with Benet 
because it offers a lens on the diversity of human-animal relations in one life story and because it 
revolves largely around the interrelated processes of witnessing and mourning animal and human 
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lives. Dolors talks at length about two very different kinds of animals and human-animal relations: 
her encounters with the feral pigeons of Barcelona and her memories of her pet dogs. Drawing on 
historical research on animal agency, I consider what Dolors’ testimony about pigeon activity might 
tell us about these animals as historical actors. Referencing the influential work of feminist 
philosopher of science Donna Haraway, I argue that Dolors’ relationship with pigeons can be 
understand as a meeting across species in the “contact zone”.  
Following the discussion of human testimony to animal agency and interspecies relations in 
the recent past, I focus specifically on witnessing in relation to loss and violence. Here I reference 
recent research in philosophy, literature, and psychoanalysis concerned with animals and mourning 
and with human beings’ ethical responsibilities towards other animals. Dolors’ reflections upon the 
family’s pet dogs, and her sadness at her husbands’ illness and the couples’ old age, demonstrate how 
the process of mourning can work across species and how this process may help to generate a wider 
ethics of non-violence towards all animals. Finally, I argue that interviews with activists about their 
everyday lives with animals contribute to the history of the animal rights movement by adding real-
life nuance and complexity to the accounts available in animal rights philosophy. 
Animals and oral history 
Other-than-human creatures are not entirely absent from oral history. They are there in 
audiotapes, interview transcripts, and published research. Yet animals are rarely the focus of oral 
historians’ analysis. Indeed, most of us are trained first and foremost to listen to stories by, and about, 
human beings and their relationships to other people. This is reflected not only in our writing but 
also in the kinds of questions we ask and the way we conduct our interviews. Students of the practice 
are rarely directed to enquire about pets, farm animals, or wildlife the way we are about human kin 
or communities.  And when animals sneak into the interview scene they are typically treated as a 3
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nuisance - interruptions or background noise to be minimised or edited out so as not to interfere with 
the clarity of the interviewee’s narrative.   4
Yet when animals are allowed in the results can be illuminating, reminding us of the 
prominent place of animals as actors and symbols in storytelling and oral traditions across different 
cultures.  Take this opening childhood memory from the chapter “The Bear and the Sycamore Tree” 5
in Alessandro Portelli's study of Harlan County, Kentucky: 
Well, back then we didn't have no TV, or no radio or anything and at nighttime when it 
got dark you had to go in on account of snakes. We got rattlesnake and copperheads 
around here, but at nighttime we’d go in and build a fire in the fireplace and Mommy and 
my daddy would sit around and tell us stories about when they were growing up. And 
stories their parents had told them about growing up. That’s where the storytelling started 
from.  6
It is no coincidence that this story appears in a book that focuses on working-class rural and 
small-town people. To the extent that animals have a history in oral history, it is largely in relation to 
the countryside. Let’s recall that many early oral historians wrote about rural communities; in the life 
stories of hunters, farmers and other country dwellers domestic and wild animals alike are regular 
features of the day-to-day landscape. The pages of Raphael Samuel's study of Headington Quarry in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, for instance, are filled with descriptions of 
poachers’ dogs, rabbits, horses, pigs, and chickens.  Though focussed on human life and labour, 7
Samuel's study is revealing as well about the role of animals in the local economy and relevant to the 
history of animals as workers.  Oral history can also tell us how people felt about the animals they 8
worked with. Ronald Blythe's Akenfield, which has been cited as a landmark oral history study of the 
English countryside,  provides significant evidence that animals were of more than financial value to 9
rural communities. Farmers recall that horses were sometimes treated as “friends and loved like 
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men”;  for others, pigs were “individuals” with human-like characters for whom farmers had a 10
fondness.  Akenfield also provides valuable evidence of the dramatic changes in human-animal 11
relations in the English countryside in the post-war period, which witnessed the rapid expansion of 
industrial agriculture. The treatment of animals in this new environment evoked conflicting emotions 
among the rural people documented in Blythe’s study.  A young man working on a new factory farm 12
with pigs and chickens tells Blythe about the moral dilemmas he experiences at work: 
I feel that the kind of farming I do now isn’t quite “right”. Certainly it isn't satisfying. I 
long to do arable; I still dream of it. But where would I get the kind of money for even 
the smallest possible arable farm? (…) Pigs have strong personalities and it is easy to get 
fond of them. I am always getting fond of pigs and I feel a bit conscious-stricken that one 
day I just put them inside for their whole lives.  13
The village vet interviewed by Blythe reflects on the dilemma he faces when a farmer tries to justify 
the tail docking of sheep: “He might even have cheek enough to remind me that I hunt! (…) A horse 
is pleasant to treat. I am making distinctions between animals, you see. It is wrong - unjust - but I am 
making them. I am caught up in this new confusion.”  Although Blythe does not explore this “new 14
confusion” among his interviewees in detail, the examples he cites highlight some of the themes I 
explore below: what human testimony can tell us about changes in human-animal relations and 
animal behaviour across time and how these changes affected people as well as animals; people’s 
sometimes complex and contradictory attitudes towards animals; the affective bonds that sometimes 
form between across species in different times and places, even those in which people have obvious 
power of life and death over other animals; and the ethical issues thrown up by these power relations, 
in particular by the violence committed by people against animals and how human beings come to 
terms with these dilemmas in their day-to-day lives.  
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Human testimony and animal agency  
Dolors Benet was an early member of Spain's first non-governmental animal rights 
organization, the Association for the Defense of the Rights of Animals (Asociación para la Defensa 
de los Derechos del Animal, ADDA)  founded in 1976, some months after the death of Francisco 15
Franco. Four decades later, by now one of dozens of Spanish groups dedicated to animal advocacy, 
ADDA is run by a handful of volunteers and paid staff from a small office in Barcelona. It was in 
that building's basement, on a muggy July day in 2015, that I interviewed seventy-eight-year-old 
Dolors. She spoke at length about her activities in ADDA and also about her closest relationships 
with people and animals, especially dogs and pigeons. This combination provides an interesting 
opportunity to explore very different kinds of cross-species relations. In this section I interpret 
Dolors’ accounts of pigeons as a testimony to the agency exercised by those animals in their 
interactions with people as well as evidence of the possibility of cross-species encounters in 
situations of unequal power relations.  
Dogs and pigeons occupy radically different places in contemporary Western societies and, 
indeed, in contemporary animal studies. Whereas dogs and other companion animals figure 
prominently in this growing field, Colin Jerolmack notes that there is less attention to those animals 
constructed as “problems”, especially species of urban wildlife defined as “pests”.  In his historical 16
study of changing attitudes towards pigeons in modern New York City, Jerolmack demonstrates that 
a bird once regarded as gentle and valued for its sociability with humans gradually came to be seen 
as a public nuisance and threat to human health (a status summed up in the term “rats with wings”).  17
By the second half of the twentieth century, in the wake of increasing urbanization, pigeons’ low 
status was such that they had become valid objects of human ridicule, revulsion, and abuse.  18
Examples from Catalan media indicate a similar development, albeit somewhat later. In the early 
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twentieth-first century, Barcelona press sources referred to pigeons as a “plague” and “rats with 
wings”,  labelling plans to reduce the pigeon population a “battle” and even, in terms evocative of 19
Spain’s imperial past, a “crusade”.   20
Dolors’ interview bears witness to the maltreatment of pigeons by humans in the modern city. 
She expresses anger at parents who don’t interfere when their children bother the birds, declaring 
forcefully: 
You aren't superior. You’re the same, or less. They are as they are. For example, pigeons, 
the poor things, breed all year. Nature played a dirty trick on them. Birds breed in the 
spring, and that’s it. But pigeons breed all year. They have to struggle all their lives to 
feed their children. For example, I, on the balcony, I have a bird feeder. I put out food for 
the birds all year.  (…) There used to be pigeon lofts on the roofs, for them to breed. Now 
they have no place to go. What right do they have?  21
Dolors’ description of her relationship with pigeons echoes an excerpt from an interview I conducted 
with another member of ADDA. When I asked Carla about her day-to-day relationships with animals 
she replied that after years of defending animal welfare, she had concluded that the best approach is 
one of minimum intervention. She opens the patio doors of her house to allow pigeons to feed:  
For me pigeons are perfect, because I don’t, I don’t intervene. They come because they 
want to. There they are. Sometimes they stay for a while, keeping me company. And they 
jump up on the table. But then they go.   22
In some ways Dolors’ and Carla’s accounts of their interactions with pigeons are familiar 
ones for oral history, which often presents the memories of “ordinary people” as counter-narratives 
to official histories or hegemonic versions of the recent past — in this case constructions of urban 
feral pigeons as “rat with wings”. We can also understand their narratives as a form of testimony: 
Dolors and Carla bear witness to the violence sometimes suffered by other-than-human animals at 
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the hands of human beings (I will have more to say about oral history narrators as witnesses to 
violence against animals below). Finally, like oral history studies that make creative use of what John 
Howard calls “twice-told stories” or “hearsay evidence” to write about the relationships of people 
who did not leave written records,  these narrators offer valuable accounts of the different kinds of 23
connections that can form across species, even in hostile environments and even though the animals 
in those relationships do not leave evidence of their experiences of those relationships.  
But I would like to go further. When read alongside other kinds of evidence these eye-witness 
accounts can also tell us something about the changing activities of the pigeons themselves. In 2002 
a leading figure in animal history, Erica Fudge, claimed that although this new area of study had 
yielded “much absolutely fascinating and rewarding work”, it should not strictly speaking be called 
“the history of animals”. According to Fudge, a history of animals was technically impossible 
because historians writing about other creatures in the past faced two insurmountable barriers: 
periodization and sources, both of them central to the discipline of history. Because animals do not 
share with people a sense of temporality and do not leave written documents of their lives, they 
cannot, strictly speaking, have a history. Fudge proposed instead the label “the history of human 
attitudes towards animals”.  24
At stake in this claim that the history of animals can only ever be a history of human attitudes 
towards them and not a history of the experiences of the animals themselves are both conceptual and 
methodological issues: what we understand by the history of animals, on one hand, and how to 
identify and interpret evidence in order to write it, on the other. In recent years some historians have 
challenged the assumption that we can only write about animals as human representations, arguing 
that it is desirable and possible to understand animals as historical agents, “as active beings rather 
than as static objects”.  Fudge herself has revised her earlier claim about the impossibility of a 25
history of animals. In a 2013 article she revisited the question of historiography, this time asking how 
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historians might write about animals as actors.  Beginning with a seventeenth-century written 26
account of a specific human-animal encounter — a woman milking cows — Fudge turns to animal 
science and sensory studies to help her interpret both sides of this meeting across species. In doing so 
she addresses her earlier concerns about sources and periodisation. Scientific studies, concludes 
Fudge, can help historians both to imagine what it was “like like to be a cow”  in early modern 27
England, and to historicize that experience by understanding how it differed from those of dairy 
cows in other historical periods. 
Following the lead of Fudge and others  I propose that Dolors’ and Carla’s accounts of 28
pigeon-human relations can be historically contextualised with reference to recent research in pigeon 
ecology. One study conducted in the early twentieth-first century, for example, concludes that feral 
pigeons living in large European cities have learned to identify friendly human feeders, and to 
gravitate towards them and away from more hostile people.  In other words, pigeons do not act only 29
out of instinct (often understood as a timeless, fixed form of behaviour, in contrast to the rational 
historically contingent decision-making unique to humans), but make choices in their quest for food 
and resting places. These choices are made with an awareness of differing kinds of human behavior. 
Against this background we can understand the pigeons who visit Dolors and Carla as historical 
actors seeking out safe settings to gather and feed in a contemporary city populated by potentially 
dangerous humans, choosing which people to form relationships with in a specific time and place.  
Although the pigeons on Dolors’ balcony and Carla’s patio did not leave traditional historical 
records,  the human testimony in these interviews provides evidence of their agency. Attributing 30
agency in the past to animals and other nonhuman entities  involves a reconceptualization of agency 31
as something not unique to human beings, nor necessarily dependent on human qualities such as 
consciousness, will, and intentionality.  It also requires an expansive definition of intelligence as an 32
ability manifested in different ways in different species. Pigeons, for example, display intelligence in 
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their use of memory and categorization skills when foraging for food.  As Fudge has argued, the 33
intelligence of pigeons and many other animals is underestimated or even denied by people who 
define intelligence in terms of the human capacity for language.  But if we understand animal 34
intelligence to be based on different criteria the relationship between intelligence and human 
language seems more fragile. Dolors repeatedly states in her interview that animal difference does 
not equate with animal inferiority and her care of pigeons is a manifestation of that principle. Her 
understanding of and being in the world has been shaped by this particular cross-species encounter.  
Following the work of Donna Haraway, we might further understand Dolors’ balcony and the 
entrance to Carla’s house as “contact zones” for the meeting of different species.  Haraway adopts 35
and adapts the term contact zone from postcolonial theorist Mary Louise Pratt, who uses it to 
foreground “the interactive, improvisational dimensions of colonial encounters so easily ignored or 
suppressed by diffusionist accounts of conquest and domination”. For Pratt, the notion of contact 
highlights the fact that subjectivity is constituted through interrlationality. Contact zones recognize 
the agency of all subjects who interrelate within them even though such zones are typically 
characterized by “radically asymmetrical relations of power”.  By theorizing human-animal 36
relations as a coming together in the contact zone, Haraway rejects anthropocentric assumptions of 
human superiority as well as those animal rights philosophies that emphasize human control over 
other creatures at the expense of interrelatedness and mutually constituted subjectivity.  Central to 37
Haraway’s reconceptualization of the contact zone, therefore, is the shared agency of humans and 
animals including in situations where different species exercise different degrees of power. If animals 
are actors in the contact zone, shaping and sharing history alongside humans, their actions shape the 
historical subjectivity of those humans as well. People and animals alike are made and unmade when 
species meet inside the contact zone.  
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Bearing witness to violence against animals  
By talking about the pigeons she observes in public squares and on her balcony, Dolors is not 
only providing evidence of a particular cross-species relationship and of animal agency; she is also 
bearing witness to the violence sometimes suffered by those creatures in contemporary Barcelona. 
Witnessing in oral history is often focussed on atrocities committed against human beings by other 
humans. In situations of genocide or other forms of mass violence the testimonies of survivors and 
outsiders provide invaluable historical evidence of lives lived and destroyed and of people’s 
resistance to violence and oppression. Crucially, such eye-witness accounts also challenge 
oppressors’ attempts to control the historical record through censorship, obliteration of individual 
and collective memory, and destruction of written documents and material culture. Witnessing in 
such contexts is therefore an explicitly political act; it recognizes hierarchies (most notably of race, 
religion, gender, class) and opposes them through empathy with the victims and survivors of 
violence along with a commitment to relay and publicize their stories.  In cases where the observer 38
is an outsider witnessing amounts to translating into spoken language the experiences of those who 
have been silenced by violence, whether through death or trauma.  
In a recent article detailing her ethnographic research with dairy cows Kathryn Gillespie 
argues that witnessing can and should also work to contest hierarchies and power relations among 
different species.  Human witnessing across species boundaries is particularly important, she argues, 39
when animals are treated as objects for human use and abuse, most notable in the case of farm 
animals destined for human consumption as food and other products. Although less extreme we can 
also consider the example, recounted by Dolors, of people taunting and mistreating the pigeons of 
Barcelona. When there are substantial power imbalances between human beings and animals, 
bearing witness can be, in the words of Gillespie, “a subversive political act of acknowledging an 
animal’s subjectivity and her embodied experience”.  Witnessing can help to ensure that physical 40
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destruction does not eliminate all traces of a lived existence; but it can also take a physical and 
emotional toll on the witness. People who witness violence, including violent forms of killing, 
against other humans and other-than-human animals may themselves experience grief.  Although 41
grief is often considered to be a private affair it can be made public and politicized through the acts 
of speaking or writing, that is, through the creation of a record and through a commitment to 
defending the victims of violence and challenging the violence itself. In the case of Dolors, the 
decision to defend animals against violence led to a lifetime commitment to animal rights, one that 
formed a bridge between her private life and public activism. The following section looks in more 
detail at how the processes of grief, mourning, and politics come together in her interview.  
Mourning in the contact zone    
When I met Dolors she was living with her ailing husband, rarely leaving his side, except to 
do the daily shopping. Her meeting with me was a break in her usual routine, a rare chance to talk at 
length to someone other than her husband. And talk she did. In her own words: “When I get to 
talking, love, I don't stop!”  Dolors’ speech was animated and punctured with laughter but she also 42
touched on the heavier side of life. Following some discussion of her activist years at the outset of 
the interview, she paused to reflect: 
This is another moment of my life. The saddest part. Because we can expect little in the 
way of good now. Very little. That’s how life is. My husband is 86. That’s his age. I’m 
78. So, now comes the descent. We can’t fool ourselves. That’s the way it is.  43
Her husband’s illness brought with it another loss: because of his frailty and the couple’s limited 
mobility they could no longer share their lives with dogs. Throughout the interview Dolors’ account 
of her family life moves back and forth between happy memories of close human and canine 
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companionship and painful reflections on their endings. Indeed, the processes of mourning human 
and animal lives are not easy to disentangle. 
Dolors introduces us to the dogs in her life early on, recalling the strays who roamed her 
family’s popular Barcelona neighborhood in the harsh years following the Spanish civil war. After 
they married Dolors and her husband struggled to find an apartment to share with their pets: 
Sometimes they don’t want them. So I had to get rid of them. Well. My two little dogs, a 
female and a male. And that’s how it was, until that day, I was going to do the shopping, I 
was in the street. I don’t know how they let him go. An adorable little dog. Really lovely. 
[Sigh] And ever since then, after one, we’ve always had two. Always abandoned ones. 
Until this last one, who died just now, in January. But because of my husband’s illness - 
he’s old too. He’s not stable. So we can’t have anymore. That’s our real sorrow. Because 
we would have more. But now it just can’t be.  44
The themes of loss, illness, and ageing merge here with a palpable sense of grief. But this 
passage also rings with the joyful memory — marked by a strong sigh — of the family’s first rescue 
dog. The affection Dolors and her husband share for the dogs in their lives emerges again later in the 
interview: 
Dogs love you so much. No matter how much I love them I’ll never love them as much 
as they love us. It’s something… Every time I see a dog, wow. Ah! We lose sight. They 
give us so much happiness, so much - Now we’re alone. Imagine. We have the same, but 
we’re missing him. And even more because we can’t have any more. I’d have another 
one. He died in January. But I’d love to have another one. But it can’t be. And the 
emptiness that it’s left - it’s something nothing can fill.  45
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Dolors’ lament for her recently deceased dog and her pain at the absence of canine 
companionship are intimately tied to her grief at the fading of human life — the deterioration of her 
husband’s health and the end of her own and his youth. The repeated association between human and 
animal mortality in this interview resonates with recent research in animal studies that theorizes grief 
and mourning across species. The philosopher Chloë Taylor, for example, has argued that Judith 
Butler’s influential writing on corporeal vulnerability is relevant to relationships between people and 
animals as well as those among human beings. In “Violence, Mourning, Politics” Butler argues that 
the recognition of a common bodily vulnerability among people can provide the basis for a collective 
response to military violence and for a new kind of ethics in the face of atrocities committed against 
different human communities.  Written in the period following the attacks of September 2001, 46
Butler’s piece proposes that the suffering and grief caused by the attacks need not have led inevitably 
to retributive violence but could have resulted instead in recognition of the suffering and grief of 
others. An acknowledgment of vulnerability based on common human mortality could in turn 
engender a sense of responsibility towards those vulnerable to different kinds of violence, including 
the military force exercised in the name of protecting “us”. Butler is very careful to stress that this 
“us” or “we” is difficult to define and that the recognition that all people share a bodily vulnerability 
does not mean that all people are equally vulnerable to violence. Indeed, an ethical encounter 
depends upon an awareness of the different degrees of human vulnerability.  Yet within these 47
differences Butler proposes that grief itself may provide the basis for a recognition of our ethical 
responsibility towards others and indeed the basis for political community.  Taylor takes Butler to 48
task for focusing too narrowly on the human and “exclud(ing) animals from the sphere of ethical 
consideration”. Nevertheless, Taylor is inspired by Butler’s writing to consider the ways in which 
violence, mourning and ethics can extend across species.  What she identifies as missing in Butler’s 49
work Taylor finds in literary texts, specifically J. M. Coetzee’s Disgrace. According to Taylor, as the 
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novel’s main character David comes to recognize his own psychical and emotional frailty he begins 
to empathize more fully with other animals, especially abandoned dogs, and to acknowledge his 
responsibility towards them.  Thus the novel provides an example of “an extended Butlerian ethics, 50
one that considers the corporeal vulnerability of both human and non-human animals”.   51
In her book Melancholia’s Dog, the literary critic Alice A. Kuzniar likewise looks to literature 
and philosophy, as well as psychoanalysis, to explore the complex emotional ties between people and 
dogs. Influenced in part by Sigmund Freud’s “Mourning and Melancholia”, Kuzniar argues that in 
contemporary Western culture human-canine relations are often melancholic because of the popular 
disavowal of the affective dimension of the relationship. Although dogs are probably the closest of 
all animals to human beings this disavowal means that people’s feelings for their canine companions 
are conditioned by shame.  Thus when a beloved pet dog dies the feelings of loss cannot be fully 52
expressed; mourning is not allowed and melancholia ensues. In her reading of a number of modern 
and contemporary cultural texts — novels, artwork, and films — Kuzniar finds many examples of 
such melancholic human-canine relations but identifies as well alternative models that provide a 
form of redemption. Like Taylor, she cites Disgrace as a literary representation of human-canine 
relations characterized not by melancholia but by mourning. In Coetzee’s novel a transformation in 
the human protagonist is occasioned by a willingness to confront the reality of dog death not with 
indifference or disavowal but with grief and ritual. A similar turning point occurs, according to 
Kuzniar, in Alejandro González Iñarritu's Amores Perros (Love's a Bitch [2000]). A film that brings 
together three very different tales of human-canine relations in a single catastrophic moment, Amores 
Perros also links fratricidal conflict and murder with violence against dogs. The third story of the 
triptych revolves around a middle-aged former revolutionary-turned-occasional-hitman, El Chivo, 
who, having abandoned his human family years ago, now lives an itinerant life surrounded by canine 
kin. The moment of transformation in El Chivo’s life comes when a Rottweiler he has rescued and 
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nursed back to health kills the rest of his dog family. Beside himself with grief, El Chivo holds back 
from killing the Rottweiler in revenge. Like David in Disgrace, he honors the lives and deaths of the 
dogs by giving them a ritual farewell. It is at this stage too that El Chivo begins to mourn his human 
family. As Kuzniar writes, “(…) only by first admitting to himself the devastation of the loss of 
canine life is El Chivo able to realize what he has been repressing all his life — the repercussions of 
the loss of human life”.  53
Dolors’ interview is not as dramatic as either Disgrace or Love’s a Bitch, nor are her 
memories of human and canine life conditioned by the same degree of violence. What connects her 
interview to these cultural representations of human-canine life and death, as well as to the 
theorizations of mourning and melancholia cited above, is the repeated association of people’s and 
dogs’ vulnerability and the interrelated processes of mourning human and canine life. In Dolors’ 
story, as in the work of Taylor and Kuzniar, the point is not that there is a straightforward comparison 
between the experiences of people and dogs but rather that the narrator’s reflection on human frailty 
evokes memories of animal mortality, and vice versa. 
But there is something more going on in Dolors’ story. What draws my attention in this 
interview is the close connection between memories of lost canine companionship, the reckoning 
with her own and her husband’s mortality, and Dolors’ wider political commitment to animal life and 
welfare. Her mourning, I suggest, extends beyond the grief she expresses for the dogs and humans in 
her immediate family circle to a mourning for the violence committed by human beings against 
animals generally. Early in the interview, after summing up her early days in ADDA in the 1970s, 
Dolors returns to the present moment:  
Now I’ve retired, because my husband is sick. But it’s always seemed to me something - 
the most beautiful struggle, but at the same time the saddest. When you realize the 
problem, you can’t avoid it. It pops into your mind. Maybe you’re laughing and suddenly 
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you think of something you’ve heard about, and it’s there, you know? Because I think it’s 
an injustice, the greatest there can be. Because you might hurt a child, but later he’s able 
to defend himself. He can’t talk, but no animal can. And we abuse that. So it seems to me 
that we’re just one more form of life. We’re not more or less. Just another form of life. 
We do the same as the others, and the others the same as us. And that’s how it started. I 
made myself available, and up to now.   54
Dolors’ remark that “(h)e can’t talk, but no animal can,” recalls the discussion above about 
witnessing in the context of beings unable to speak for themselves. Because animals cannot “talk 
back” to their human abusers, they need other human beings to bear witness to the abuse they suffer, 
human beings who will defend them. Making herself available to the animal rights movement has 
meant a lifetime of witnessing the violence done to different animals. 
In thinking through the interrelated processes of mourning human and animal life, Taylor and 
Kuzniar are concerned not just with death but with violent death, in particular that of animals. Both 
scholars suggest that an avowal of the value of individual animals, and of human responsibility 
towards them, can provide the basis for a new kind of ethical relationship towards other-than-human 
animals. Kuzniar expresses this view most clearly when she criticizes those animal rights activists in 
the United Kingdom, Germany, and the United States who called for the censorship of Love’s a Bitch 
because the film may have involved cruelty to dogs on set (despite the filmmakers’ assurances to the 
contrary).  Such reactions, Kuzniar claims, demonstrate a limited understanding of the relationship 55
between artistic representation and human responsibility towards animals. Since the film portrays 
violence against dogs as inhumane it could have been embraced as an important representation of an 
ethics of nonviolent human-animal relations.  Such an attitude would have focused not just on what 56
happened to the animals involved in the filming but could also have precipitated “meaningful ethical 
debate on the magnitude and profound implications of animal loss”.  57
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The wider issue Kuzniar is raising here, and the wider ethics with which her book is 
concerned, is whether people’s empathy towards individual animals — in this case dogs —  can form 
the basis for a more general challenge to the different forms of inequality and cruelty that frequently 
condition human-animal relations.  While history indicates that this is certainly not always the case 58
(in the contemporary world, for example, many people who love their pets are complicit through 
their consumption habits with abuse against animals on industrial farms), Dolors’ testimony gives us 
evidence that for some people a personal commitment to other creatures can lead to a commitment to 
the protection of animal lives in general. Dolors’ mutually-enforcing appreciation for human and 
canine life, and the enormity of their loss, allows her to recognize human beings’ responsibility 
towards other creatures, including our duty not to do them harm. Like the protagonists of Disgrace 
and Love’s a Bitch, this recognition becomes the basis for alternative ethics towards animals. In 
Taylor’s terms, Dolors’ interview is an opportunity for “dwelling with (her) own vulnerability (…) 
mak(ing) her empathetic to the vulnerability of all bodies”.  59
Oral testimony and the history of animal rights activism   
Listening to Dolors’ grief over the loss of her dogs and the pain suffered by other animals I 
was reminded of an interview with the British animal rights activist Ronnie Lee, part of the Animal 
Welfare Activists collection archived at the the National Sound Archive in the British Library.  A 60
founder of the Animal Liberation Front in the 1970s, Lee had dedicated most of his adult life to the 
political struggle for animal rights, spending several years in prison for his activism. Throughout his 
interview Lee speaks both of his pain and anger at witnessing cruelty to animals and of the 
satisfactions and lessons of years of activism. By the time of his meeting with interviewer Barbara 
Gibson in early 2002, Lee was living a quieter life with his partner and their rescue animals. Asked 
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towards the end of the eight-hour interview about the best and worst moments of his life, Lee 
remembers the death of a dog run over by a car while they were out walking:  
Even now it’s starting to make me cry, to think of it. It was such a traumatic experience 
really. Probably more than anything that’s the worst thing that’s happened. Because 
although it’s terrible about animal abuse and everything that goes on, when it’s your own, 
it’s much more personal when it’s your own creature.  61
Similarly to the interview with Dolors, Lee’s memories move back and forth between 
examples of abuse against different groups of animals and accounts of his relationships with 
individual animals and people. Because it incorporates a variety of interactions across species, Lee’s 
interview serves as a valuable counter-example to some of the portrayals of human-animal relations 
put forth in animal rights theory, including Peter Singer’s famous book Animal Liberation. Published 
in 1975, Animal Liberation became, according to popular sources at the time, “the bible of the 
animal liberation movement”.  The book was massively influential on Lee’s generation of activists. 62
At points in his interview Lee expresses views about animal rights similar to those put forth in 
Animal Liberation, stressing in particular the suffering of animals as the basis for people’s 
responsibility towards them. But Lee’s love for his dog and other pets is markedly at odds with 
Singer’s philosophy, which explicitly derides human affection towards animals. Indeed, Singer opens 
Animal Liberation by deliberately distancing himself from pet-keepers and self-proclaimed animal 
lovers. He and his wife, he says, are “interested in the prevention of suffering and misery” but 
“(o)therwise (…) not especially ‘interested’ in animals”.   63
If Singer believes that loving domestic animals is incompatible with a proper defence of their 
interests, Lee’s and Dolors’ interviews suggest otherwise. Their emotional bonds with animals is 
closer to Taylor’s argument for an ethics of non-violence towards animals based on an experience of 
physical vulnerability across different species than to Singer’s claim that human beings have a moral 
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responsibility towards other animals because those animals can suffer. Singer’s theory is clearly 
expressed in the opening sentence of Animal Liberation, which states that the “book is about the 
tyranny of humans over nonhuman animals.”  By stressing human responsibility both for the 64
perpetuation and prevention of animal suffering Singer emphasizes people’s agency and downplays 
that of other animals, thereby putting humans and animals in a hierarchical relationship. This is in 
clear contrast to Taylor’s work, in which vulnerability is shared by human and animal bodies, albeit, 
following Butler, unequally; a human ethics of non-violence towards animals requires that people 
recognize not only our potential power over other animals but also our shared vulnerability with all 
“animalkind”.   65
Lee’s and Dolors’ interviews remind us that people's engagement with political theory can be 
complex and even contradictory. They also point to a need for more capacious understandings of 
theory itself. This is one of the lessons I take from Haraway’s writing on cross-species encounters: in 
order to be open to the experience of the nonhuman other and to the lessons of our meetings with 
them, we might need to recognize the limits of our bookish learning.  I interpret this not as a form of 66
anti-intellectual populism (one could hardly accuse Haraway of that) but a validation of the different 
kinds of knowledge offered by research methods that rely on interaction with and observation of live 
subjects.  
In a similar vein, in her ethnographic study of contemporary English people's relationship to 
their pets Rebekah Fox argues that interviews and field research add important nuance to animal 
studies precisely by exploring how theoretical claims about human-animal relations play out in 
people’s reflections on their day-to-day lives. In particular Fox notes that ethnography can provide a 
useful contrast to rational understandings of the subject as found in some philosophies of human-
animal relations:  
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The intimate embodied nature of the human-pet relationship challenges such ways of 
defining subjectivity, through other types of relationality and connection, which are not 
purely based upon notions of language or intelligence. This (is a) “lived 
intersubjectivity” of two beings sharing a messy, awkward, loving relationship...  67
Similarly, oral history, with its particular interest in the affective dimensions of life as expressed in 
memory, may help to bring out the “messy, awkward” nature of human-animal relations, adding 
complexity both to theoretical debates and fleshing out our understanding of the history of the animal 
rights movement.  
Conclusion  
Examining the themes of mourning and witnessing in an interview with an ageing woman 
who has dedicated much of her adult life to defending other animals, this article has demonstrated 
that oral history can bring valuable life-story evidence to contemporary academic research on 
human-animal relations and to the history of the contemporary animal rights movement. Following 
the tradition of oral history that vindicates witnessing and mourning as responses to violence 
committed against people, and inspired in particular by the work of Judith Butler, I have argued that 
these can be political tools as well as emotional processes. Acknowledging the potentially political 
dimension of mourning animals is particularly important in relation to pets. As Alice Kuzniar 
demonstrates, the relationship between people and their companion animals is often represented in 
contemporary Western societies as an infantile attachment, emotionally inferior to the properly 
mature love between people. The pathologizing of the human-pet bond is evident in some writings 
on animal rights, most notoriously Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation, which reserves special 
contempt for middle-aged female pet owners.  
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In the light of such stubborn and sexist stereotyping, it would be all too easy to dismiss the 
interview with Dolors Benet as a quaint story of a “woman who loves animals”. Contra Singer, the 
evidence presented here demonstrates that love for companion animals and a commitment to end the 
suffering of all creatures are not mutually exclusive. This article also refuses the zero sum logic that 
pits the defence of animal rights against a commitment to the lives and welfare of human beings,  68
showing that that there are cases where these are mutually reinforcing. By drawing attention to the 
“entangled”  memories of human and canine vulnerability in Dolors’ interview, I have therefore 69
endeavored to encourage oral historians to be alert to stories about animals in our interviewers’ 
narratives and in so doing enlarge our understanding of our subjects’ histories, contexualizing them 
in a wider world that encompasses relations across species as well as among people.  
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